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GROWING APART? A TALE OF 





We compare and contrast the economic growth performance of Estonia and Georgia since the 
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 in an attempt to understand better the extent to which the 
growth differential between the two countries can be traced to increased efficiency in the use 
of capital and other resources (intensive growth) as opposed to brute accumulation of capital 
(extensive growth). We infer that advances in education at all levels, good governance, and 
institutional reforms have played a more significant role in raising economic output and 
efficiency in Estonia than in Georgia which remains marred by various problems related to 
weak governance in the public and private spheres. 
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1. Introduction 
Looking at the fate of the fifteen states that emerged from the Soviet Union, we find it 
striking how different their economic evolution has been since the collapse of the 
Soviet Union in 1991. One especially interesting feature is that the three Baltic States 
that are now members of the European Union (EU) have fared so much better in 
economic terms than any of the other Former Soviet Union (FSU) states, including 
Russia (Figure 1). The question is: Why?  
This paper aims to shed light on this question by applying standard growth 
economics to a comparison of the recent growth performance of two of the FSU 
countries, Estonia and Georgia, one from each tier in Figure 1. Both countries are 
small (45,226 km², population 1.3 million, and 69,700 km², population 4.7 million, 
respectively). Both are poorly endowed with natural resources, which may be good 
for their growth potential as suggested by Sachs and Warner (1995) and others, and 
both share a distant history of prosperity which, at the time, brought them 
considerable wealth. Estonia prospered when Tallinn (Reval) became part of the 
Hanseatic League, from 1285 onward. Georgia also prospered it its Golden Era from 
the 11
th to the 13
th century when the Georgian kingdom expanded to include most of 
the Caucasus before disintegrating in the 15
th century following the Mongol invasions. 
Imperial Russia illegally annexed Georgia in 1801. Estonia’s fortune did not last 
either. Having first been brought under Swedish rule in the turbulent 16
th and 17
th 
centuries (southern Estonia briefly also came under Polish-Lithuanian rule), Estonia, 
like Georgia 80 years later, was annexed by Russia in 1721.  
Both countries became independent in 1918. Estonia retained its independence 
until 1940, when it was annexed by the Soviet Union under the Hitler-Stalin Pact. At 
the time, Estonia’s national income per capita was roughly on par with that of Finland 
across the bay. Georgia’s independence was much more short-lived, because the Red 
Army invaded the country in 1921 on the orders of Joseph Stalin, a native Georgian 
(and, incidentally, against the wishes of Lenin). The reversal of fortune experienced 
by both countries accords with the view advanced particularly clearly by Acemoglu, 
Johnson, and Robinson (2002) that institutions – in the present case, bad institutions – 
matter for economic growth. Geography isn’t everything.  
Under Soviet rule, the economic decline of the three Baltic republics – Estonia, 
Latvia, and Lithuania – was substantial but, overall, their economic situation remained   3
better than in other Soviet republics, not least the Caucasus republics. However, 
official statistics may have overstated the differences because of Georgia’s larger 
underground – that is, unrecorded – economy. In any case, the initial conditions for 
economic catch-up following Estonia and Georgia’s secession from the Soviet Union 
in 1991 were more favorable in Estonia than in Georgia. Even so, Estonia’s gross 
domestic product (GDP) per capita adjusted for purchasing power parity had sunk 
from approximate parity in 1940 to about one third of that of Finland in 1991. Estonia, 
after regaining independence in 1991, quickly embarked on bold and decisive 
political, institutional, and economic reforms that were carried out by successive 
coalition governments from different parts of the political spectrum. Within less than 
fifteen years, Estonia was able to accede to the EU and its gross national income 
(GNI) per capita rose to a half of that of Finland. Today, Estonia is on a strong, 
sustainable path of rapid real growth and convergence to Finland and the rest of the 
EU membership. Moreover, apart from its inflation rate that, according to the 
Maastricht criteria, remains too high, Estonia is ready to adopt the euro and discard 
the kroon.  
In contrast, Georgia, after regaining independence, was torn by civil war, was 
caught in a low-income trap, and suffered from pervasive corruption as well as from a 
conspicuous lack of economic and institutional reforms. It was not until the Rose 
Revolution in 2003, which led to the fall of the Shevardnadze government, that the 
situation of the country changed enough to rekindle hopes for fundamental political, 
institutional, and economic reforms that could at last make economic catch-up 
feasible. In 2007, Georgia became “the number one economic reformer” according to 
World Bank (2007). Between 2006 and 2007 Georgia skyrocketed from 112
th place to 
18
th by the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Index where Georgia is now just 
one place behind Estonia, which ranks 17
th (same source). 
The national economy of the Soviet Union and its constituent republics is now 
widely acknowledged to have been stagnant or worse for quite some time before the 
economic collapse that commenced in 1989. The severity of the plunge during and 
after 1989 varied from republic to republic and was probably closely related to the 
extent of the systemic failure of central planning as well as to local mismanagement 
that preceded the plunge. As Figure 2 shows, the plunge was significantly deeper and 
lasted longer in Georgia than in Estonia. In Georgia, GDP per capita measured in 
constant US dollars at 2000 prices and adjusted for purchasing power parity   4
contracted by almost 80 percent from 1988 to 1994 while in Estonia the contraction 
amounted to 33 percent from 1989 to 1993. Even so, since 1993, Estonia’s GDP per 
capita has subsequently grown more rapidly than that of Georgia, or by 6.6 percent 
per year compared with 6.1 percent in Georgia.  
Estonia’s more rapid growth after the initial plunge may seem surprising because 
it might have appeared easier for Georgia to grow more rapidly from such a low initial 
level of output after the fall. The fact that Estonia grew more rapidly than Georgia 
after the collapse suggests that initial output was only one of several determinants of 
the two countries’ growth trajectories during this period. In 1980, Estonia’s GDP per 
head was about 1.5 times that of Georgia. Since 1993, the income differential between 
the two countries has exceeded four, approaching five. A logarithmic representation 
of the evolution of GDP per capita in Figure 3 suggests that the income differential 
between the two countries in 2005, the latest year for which comparable GDP figures 
are available from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 2007 at the time 
of writing, stems mostly from the fact that, of the two, Georgia suffered a much 
deeper contraction of measured output after 1989. The puzzle here is: Why, then, did 
Georgia not grow more rapidly than Estonia thereafter?  
To repeat, Estonia has had a double advantage over Georgia. Estonia grew much 
more rapidly from 1991 to 2006 both because the initial slump of output was 
shallower and more short-lived than in Georgia and also because, after the slump, 
Estonia managed to grow more rapidly than Georgia despite Georgia’s much lower 
initial level of output per person when growth resumed in 1994.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 lays out, in the 
simplest possible terms, the theoretical framework guiding the discussion to follow. In 
Section 3, selected economic, political, and social indicators are employed to 
illuminate the possible reasons for the divergent economic developments in the two 
countries under review. In Section 4, before summarizing our main findings, we 
briefly discuss the policy implications of the growth experiences of the two countries 
and suggest potential lessons for other countries that lag behind their erstwhile equals.  
 
2. Theoretical Background 
Economic growth can be either extensive, driven forward by the accumulation of dead 
capital, or it can be intensive, by which is meant growth that springs from more   5
efficient use of existing capital and other resources. Among the numerous alternative 
ways of increasing economic and social efficiency, one of the most obvious is the 
accumulation of live capital – that is, human capital – through education, on-the-job 
training, and health care. There are many other ways as well to increase efficiency and 
thereby economic growth. Adam Smith and David Ricardo showed how free trade can 
enable individuals and countries to break outside the production frontiers that, under 
autarky, would confine them to lower standards of life. Other examples abound, as the 
theory of endogenous economic growth and its empirical implementation in recent 
years have made clear. Today, for instance, in view of the rapidly advancing 
theoretical and empirical literature on economic growth, it is now widely recognized 
that the quality of institutions and good governance can help generate sustained 
economic growth and so can also various other factors that are closely related to 
economic organization, institutions, and policy (Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005; see 
also Dixit, 2004). We want to ascertain whether the growth differential between 
Estonia and Georgia since 1991 can be traced mostly to efficiency (i.e., intensive 
growth), as we suspect, rather than accumulation (i.e., extensive growth). 




Here Y is national economic output, A is a parameter that reflects total factor 
productivity (TFP), or efficiency, that is, the ability to convert inputs into output, H is 
human capital, K is real capital, N is natural capital, including land, and L is raw 
labor. The four exponents are the output elasticities of the inputs and lie between zero 
and one. By dividing through the production function by labor, we obtain this 




Hence, output per capita depends on four factors:  
(i)  Efficiency  
(ii)  Human capital per person  
(iii)  Capital/labor ratio  
(iv)  Natural capital per person    6
There are two things to note about this classification. First, if it so happened that 
human capital, real capital, and natural capital all grew at the same rate as the labor 
force, then advances in efficiency (A) would remain as the sole source of economic 
growth, by which we mean the rate of growth of output per person. The second point 
is that just as, in nature, some plants grow faster than others, so do different types of 
capital grow at different rates. While experience suggests that real capital grows at 
roughly the same rate as output over long periods, rendering the capital/output ratio 
constant over time, human capital can easily grow more rapidly than real capital, 
while natural capital – certainly that part of it that is nonrenewable, but also some 
renewable natural capital such as fish in the sea – tends to grow less rapidly than real 
capital. This, by the way – or think of fixed land, if you prefer – is why increased 
population growth, against common intuition, tends to slow down economic growth.  
Different growth rates of the different determinants of economic growth mean that 
the rate of growth of output per capita must be a weighted combination of the growth 
rates of the different inputs. We could simplify the story by imposing on the 
production function the requirement that capital and output grow in tandem. If we did, 
as is customary in parts of the growth literature, this would reduce the number of the 
determinants of long-run growth from four to three: efficiency, human capital per 
person, and natural capital per person. We do not, however, pursue this simplification 
here because we want to emphasize not so much long-run growth of potential output 
as the medium-term growth of the actual level of output. In our equations above, the 
efficiency parameter A comprises a variety of factors, among them technological 
advances and other types of efficiency gains from various sources, including internal 
as well as external trade, “good” institutions, and “good” governance (Williamson, 
2005; see also Marsiliani and Renström, 2007). Governance, in turn, is a broad 
concept, and subsumes managerial, fiscal, monetary, financial, and external 
governance, each of which comprises several components.  
The examination of some of these “unbundled” governance factors is at the core 
of our attempt to answer the question of why Estonia has grown so much more rapidly 
than Georgia. This requires a comparative review of a number of different economic, 
political, and social indicators to which we now turn.    7
3.  Empirical Evidence 
We are aware that fifteen years of macroeconomic data following the collapse of the 
Soviet Union that started in 1989 is too short a period to be amenable to a fully 
fledged long-run economic growth analysis in the spirit of, for example, Hall and 
Jones (1999). Instead, against the background provided in the preceding section, we 
intend to ask whether the pattern of those macroeconomic variables that recent growth 
research has identified as potentially important determinants of output per person and 
thereby also ultimately of long-run economic growth in cross-country comparisons 
have behaved in ways that can shed some light on economic developments in Estonia 
and Georgia since independence. Full-fledged growth accounting in which output 
growth could be traced in quantifiable proportions to the underlying inputs and the 
efficiency with which they were used is beyond the scope of the present exercise. 
 
A. Investment and Education 
Let us start with domestic investment, a key determinant of the capital/labor ratio and 
of economic growth. Which of the two countries has put aside more resources for 
capital formation since 1989? As Figure 4 shows, Estonia invested 29 percent of GDP 
in machinery and equipment on average from 1989 to 2005 compared with 20 percent 
in Georgia. The same applies to investments in human capital. With 95 percent 
enrolment at the primary-school level, Georgia has not quite achieved parity with 
Estonia’s 100 percent primary-school enrolment rate. Moreover, Figure 5 shows that 
nearly all Estonian youngsters attend secondary schools compared with four fifths of 
Georgians. In 2004, nearly two thirds of young Estonians attended colleges and 
universities compared with 42 percent in Georgia. In recent years, public and private 
expenditure on education amounted to about six percent of GDP in Estonia compared 
with two percent in Georgia.  
  Other indicators point in the same direction. In Estonia, there were 483 personal 
computers per 1,000 inhabitants in 2005, almost the same figure as in Finland, 
compared with 42 personal computers in Georgia in 2004. Likewise, in Estonia, there 
were 513 internet users per 1,000 inhabitants in 2005, the same as in Finland in 2004; 
the Georgian figure for 2004 is 39 internet users per 1,000 inhabitants. Estonia now 
has more mobile phone subscribers than people, surpassing even Finland next door, 
while Georgia has 326 mobile phone subscribers per 1,000 inhabitants. Education and   8
technological sophistication are clearly conducive to a business-friendly climate for 
domestic as well as foreign investment. 
Understandably, foreign investment was virtually nonexistent in the early 1990s, 
but since then Estonia has attracted more capital from abroad than Georgia. 
Specifically, net inflows of foreign direct investment in Estonia amounted to seven 
percent of GDP 1992-2005 on average compared with four percent in Georgia (Figure 
6). Estonia has clearly been more open toward the influx of foreign capital.  
Domestic and foreign investment and education at all levels are key sources of the 
accumulation of real capital and human capital. Together as well as separately, they 
are important determinants of output per person and economic growth. As far as those 
two time-honored pillars of productivity and growth are concerned, Estonia 
outperformed Georgia during the transition period, so there is perhaps little wonder, 
then, that Estonia’s output per person has grown more rapidly than that of Georgia. 
Today, the people of Estonia enjoy a markedly higher standard of life than they did 
under Soviet rule whereas the people of Georgia remain significantly worse off (recall 
Figures 1 and 2).  
 
B. Exports, Inflation, and Economic Structure 
Estonia has also been more open than Georgia toward foreign trade. Exports of goods 
and services from Estonia were equivalent to 73 percent of GDP on average 1992-
2005 compared with 33 percent in Georgia (Figure 7). The export figures include re-
exports. While Estonia eliminated all import duties after 1995, Georgia has continued 
to depend on such import restrictions for about ten percent of its tax revenues (Figure 
8). Further, it takes, on average, twice as long for importers to clear customs in 
Georgia (3.4 days) as in Estonia (1.7 days). Free trade is good for growth.  
Price stability is also good for growth. Figure 9 shows that in the 1990s Georgia 
managed to bring inflation down almost as far as Estonia. However, in the early 1990s 
inflation was much higher in Georgia than in Estonia as a result of severe initial 
monetary overhang and other problems. It is, therefore, not surprising that the process 
of monetization of economic transactions has been slower in Georgia than in Estonia 
(Figure 10). Most African countries have a higher ratio of broad money to GDP – that 
is, greater financial depth – than Georgia. High inflation tends to hold back economic 
growth through various channels. It tends to do so by reducing financial depth, among   9
other things, or, if you prefer, by discouraging the accumulation of financial capital, 
thus depriving the economic system of necessary lubrication in the form of adequate 
liquidity, and insufficient lubrication hampers economic efficiency and growth.  
Even though inflation has been largely brought under control, macroeconomic 
management and organization remain problematic in Georgia. The interest-rate spread 
– that is, the interest rate charged by banks on loans to prime customers minus the 
interest rate paid by commercial or similar banks for demand, time, or savings 
deposits – is a simple measure of the efficiency of the banking system the commercial 
part of which, by the late 1990s, had in both countries been put into private hands. In 
Estonia foreigners own almost all banks assets compared with about two thirds in 
Georgia. In 2005, the interest spread was three percent in Estonia like in Finland in 
2004, a respectable figure by international standards. In Georgia, on the other hand, 
the interest spread in 2005 was fourteen percent, suggesting continued inefficiency 
and lack of competition in the banking system, or high credit risks, despite full 
privatization (see Clark, Cull, and Shirley, 2004). Privatization and foreign ownership 
may not be enough, however, to increase competition and efficiency in the banking 
system. What matters most is the transfer of know-how, managerial experience, and 
fresh capital. Still, the Georgian figure of fourteen percent constitutes a significant 
improvement from earlier years when, from 2000 to 2004, the interest spread was 
between 20 percent and 24 percent even if inflation had been brought down to single 
digits (recall Figure 9).  
Also, the Georgian economy remains heavily dependent on agriculture that still 
accounts for about a fifth of GDP as it did in the 1980s. By contrast, Estonia has little 
by little managed to diminish the share of its agriculture in GDP down to five percent 
which is only a little more than the EU average (Figure 11). This suggests both a 
stronger effort by the government to modernize the economy – by reducing farm 
support, for example – as well as greater mobility of labor and other factors of 
production between industries in Estonia than in Georgia. Accordingly, manufacturing 
and services have grown more rapidly in Estonia than in Georgia. During 1995-2005, 
manufacturing accounted for almost three fourths of Estonia’s exports compared with 
about a third in Georgia (Figure 12). This matters because a strong manufacturing 
sector is ordinarily an important contributor to economic growth, partly because it is 
conducive to research and technological progress far beyond agriculture as well as to 
the buildup of human capital. Estonia’s infrastructure is being modernized at a rapid   10
pace. Electrical outages are rare: in 2005, electrical power was interrupted for one day 
compared with 39 days in Georgia. While, in 2006, it took 35 days to start a business 
in Estonia against 16 days in Georgia, more recent figures (World Bank, 2007) show 
that the time required to start a business in Estonia has fallen to a maximum of 7 days 
compared with 11 days in Georgia. Further, the cost of registering a business is much 
lower in Estonia than in Georgia, or five percent of GNI per capita in Estonia in 2006 
against eleven percent in Georgia, down from 23 percent in 2003 (same source). The 
World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Index that ranks 178 countries by how 
conducive the regulatory environment is to business operation now puts Estonia in 
17
th place and Georgia in 18
th, up from 112
th place in 2003, as mentioned before (see 
http://www.doingbusiness.org).  
To give one more example, in Estonia, tax rates were cited as a major business 
constraint by three percent of the managers surveyed in 2005 compared with 36 
percent in Georgia. These numbers suggest that different standards of governance 
may help explain why the transition from agriculture to manufacturing, trade, and 
services has been slower in Georgia than in Estonia. 
To recapitulate, economic growth requires capital to be accumulated and to be 
efficiently used: real capital, human capital, foreign capital, and financial capital, all 
of which we have covered thus far, and also social capital to which we now turn.   
 
C. Democracy, Governance, and Demography 
Due to the difficult status of its Russian citizens, Estonia does not score as high in 
surveys of democracy as its neighbors, Latvia and Lithuania. According to political 
scientists at the University of Maryland (the Polity IV Project; see Marshall and 
Jaggers, 2001), Lithuania has scored a perfect ten since reclaiming its independence in 
1991, Latvia eight, and Estonia six. For comparison, Georgia has scored between four 
and five since 1992 and, more recently, in 2004, seven (Figure 13). Democracy, we 
think, is good for growth because it improves governance. Democratization can be 
viewed as an investment in social capital by which we mean the infrastructural glue 
that holds society together and keeps it working harmoniously and well. Social capital 
comprises several other ingredients, including trust, the absence of rampant 
corruption, and reasonable equality in the distribution of income and wealth (see 
Paldam and Svendsen, 2000). The idea here is that political oppression, corruption,   11
and excessive inequalities tend to diminish social cohesion and thereby also the 
quantity or quality of social capital.  
According to the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys, about the same proportion of 
managers surveyed in 2005 said they lacked confidence in the court system to uphold 
property rights (30 percent in Estonia, 29 percent in Georgia). Even so, in Estonia, 
only two percent of the managers surveyed described their lack of confidence in the 
courts as a major business constraint compared with twelve percent in Georgia. In 
Estonia, two percent of the managers surveyed described crime as a major business 
constraint compared with 24 percent in Georgia. Further, according to Transparency 
International, there is a marked difference between Estonia and Georgia in terms of 
corruption. Figure 14 shows a three-to-four-point difference between the corruption 
perceptions indices for Estonia and Georgia. The World Bank reports a similar 
finding. In 2005, 20 percent of managers surveyed in Georgia described corruption as 
a major constraint on their business operations compared with four percent of 
managers in Estonia. Since 1999, Estonia has made some progress in the battle against 
corruption. However, Georgia has not, and remains one of the most corrupt countries 
in the region, and the world. This probably makes a difference because corruption is 
not good for growth (Mauro, 1995; see also Bardhan, 1997). Georgian managers say 
they have to spend three percent of their time dealing with officials compared with 
two percent in Estonia.  
The distribution of income has become somewhat less unequal in Estonia than in 
Georgia; in 2003, the Gini index of inequality was 36 in Estonia and 40 in Georgia, 
whereas in the late 1990s it was 38 in both countries.  
Figure 15 shows that both countries have suffered a collapse in fertility as 
measured by the number of live births per woman since 1987. Estonia has had a 
partial recovery since 1996, but Georgia has not. The population of both countries 
continues to decline. Even if excessive fertility holds back economic growth in many 
developing countries, population decline is not likely to increase per capita growth in 
Estonia and Georgia, on the contrary. Life expectancy at birth took a deep dive in 
Estonia before 1990, did not recover until a decade later, and then sailed past that of 
Georgia in the late 1990s (Figure 16). Public and private health expenditures in 
Estonia have exceeded those in Georgia in recent years, but the gap between the two 
countries has narrowed. In 2001, Estonia had 6.7 hospital beds per 1,000 inhabitants 
compared with 4.3 in Georgia. In recent years, all child births in Estonia have been   12
attended by skilled medical staff compared with 92 percent in Georgia. Public health 
and fertility are closely related to human capital and hence important to economic 
growth over time. 
 
4. Conclusion 
Our comparison of the different development trajectories of Estonia and Georgia since 
1991 suggests policy implications that seem especially relevant to Georgia and other 
second-tier FSU states as well as to other countries elsewhere that have lagged behind 
their erstwhile equals (recall Figure 1). In brief, rapid economic growth requires 
(i)  Public policies that support education and training, free trade, and 
domestic as well as foreign investment in a business-friendly 
environment. 
(ii)  Monetary and fiscal policies that support price stability and sound private 
banking and other financial intermediation, sustainable government 
budget positions, and international, consumer-friendly competition. 
(iii)  Sound and transparent societal institutions that support the rule of law. 
(iv)  Good governance of both the public sector and the private sector.  
By and large, it seems that on all counts Estonia, up to now, has surpassed Georgia. 
While recent developments and data suggest that Georgia, at last, has begun to catch 
up, doubts remain regarding the country’s institutional reform agenda as well as the 
still unresolved territorial disputes. 
Referring back to the classification of the main determinants of economic 
efficiency and growth implied by the aggregate production function presented in 
Section 2, we can now summarize our findings as follows.  
First, Estonia has invested significantly more relative to GDP than Georgia and 
also attracted more foreign investment than Georgia, thereby accumulating capital and 
increasing output per person. Increased high-quality investment contributes to more 
rapid growth over long periods, other things being the same.  
In second place, Estonia sends more young people to secondary schools as well as 
to colleges and universities than Georgia does, thereby building up precious human 
capital that, like real capital accumulation, helps lift output per person to higher levels 
and encourage long-term growth. Estonia’s strong emphasis on education at all levels 
is reinforced by its rapidly increasing technological sophistication as evidenced by   13
widespread personal computer and mobile phone ownership.  
Third, Estonia has done more than Georgia to increase economic efficiency – that 
is, total factor productivity. This effort has taken many different forms. Let us start 
with the important trinity of liberalization, privatization, and stabilization. Estonia has 
managed to  
(i)  Increase its openness to trade in goods, services, and capital, 
(ii)  Privatize its banks and other erstwhile state enterprises while ensuring 
competition through, among other things, foreign ownership, and 
(iii)  Stabilize prices following the temporary bout of inflation that was bound 
to follow the rapid liberalization of prices at the beginning of transition. 
Georgia has not managed to liberalize trade to the same extent, nor has Georgia 
managed to privatize its banks and other state-owned enterprises while ensuring 
strong competition. On the other hand, Georgia has successfully stabilized prices, 
albeit a bit less rapidly than Estonia. On top of all this, according to almost all the 
different governance indicators that we compared for the two countries, Estonia has 
moved farther and faster in a growth-friendly direction. Most notably, corruption and 
associated problems are much less of an issue in Estonia than in Georgia. 
In view of all this, we are not surprised that Estonia has grown more rapidly than 
Georgia, despite Georgia’s advantage of starting from a much lower level of initial 
income after the plunge following independence. Our story suggests that the growth 
differential between the two countries since 1993 would probably have been 
significantly larger than half a percentage point – that is, the difference between 
Estonia’s 6.6 percent growth per year and Georgia’s 6.1 percent – had both countries 
started out in the same initial position. The proportions in which these many different 
factors account for the growth differential between the two countries since 1991 
remain to be quantified. Even so, we think the qualitative point we have made is 
pretty clear. You judge.    14
References 
Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson (2002), “Reversal of Fortune: 
Geography and Development in the Making of the Modern World Income 
Distribution,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 117, No. 4, November, 1231-
1294. 
Acemoglu, Daron, and Simon Johnson (2005), “Unbundling Institutions,” Journal of 
Political Economy, Vol. 113, No. 5, October, 949–995.  
Bardhan, Pranab (1997), “Corruption and Development: A Review of the Issues,” 
Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 35, No. 3, September, 1320-1346. 
Clarke, George R. G., Robert Cull, and Mary Shirley, “Empirical Studies of Bank 
Privatization: Some Lessons,” paper presented at the 8
th Annual Conference of the 
International Society for New Institutional Economics in Tucson, Arizona, 30 
September – 3 October, 2004.  
Dixit, Avinash (2004), Lawlessness and Economics: Alternative Institutions of 
Governance (Princeton: Princeton University Press), Chapter 1. Available at 
http://pup.princeton.edu/titles/7729.html. 
Hall, Robert E., and Charles I. Jones (1999), “Why Do Some Countries Produce So 
Much More Output Per Worker Than Others?,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
Vol. 114, No. 1, February, 83-116. 
Marshall, Monty G., and Keith Jaggers (2001), “Polity IV Project: Political Regime 
Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2000.” Available at 
http://www.cidcm.umd.edu./inscr/polity/. 
Marsiliani, Laura, and Thomas, I. Renström (2007), “Political Institutions and 
Economic Growth,” Economics of Governance, Vol. 8, No. 3, May, 233-261.  
Mauro, Paolo (1995), “Corruption and Growth,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 
110,  No. 3, August, 681-712.  
Paldam, Martin, and Gert Tinggaard Svendsen (2000), “An Essay on Social Capital: 
Looking at the Fire behind the Smoke,” European Journal of Political Economy 
Vol. 16, No. 2, June, 339-366. 
Sachs, Jeffrey D., and Andrew M. Warner (1995, revised 1997, 1999), “Natural 
Resource Abundance and Economic Growth,” NBER Working Paper 5398, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts.    15
Williamson, Oliver, 2005, “The Economics of Governance,” American Economic 
Review, Vol. 95, No. 2, May, 1–18.  
World Bank (2007), Doing Business – Economy Rankings. Available at 
http://www.doingbusiness.org. See also http://www.enterprisesurveys.org.  
   16
Figure 1. Gross National Income per capita 1991 and 2006 
(International dollars at purchasing power parity) 
 
Note: Data for Turkmenistan 2006 and Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan 1991 are not available. 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2007. 
 
 
Figure 2. Gross Domestic Product per capita 1975-2005  
(Constant 2000 international dollars at purchasing power parity) 
 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2007. 
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Figure 3. Gross Domestic Product per capita 1975-2005  
(Constant 2000 international dollars at purchasing power parity, logarithmic scale) 
 




Figure 4. Gross Capital Formation 1980-2005 (% of GDP)  
 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2007. 
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Figure 5. Secondary-School Enrolment 1991-2005 (% of Cohort)  
 





Figure 6. Foreign Direct Investment 1992-2005 (Net Inflows, % of GDP)  
 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2007. 
   19
Figure 7. Exports of Goods and Services 1987-2005 (% of GDP) 
 





Figure 8. Customs and Other Import Duties 1991-2005 (% of Tax Revenue) 
 
 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2005 and 2007. 
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Figure 9. Inflation 1993-2005 (%, Consumer Prices) 
  




Figure 10. Financial Depth 1992-2005 (Broad Money as % of GDP) 
 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2007. 
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Figure 11. Agriculture 1980-2005 (Value Added as % of GDP) 
 




Figure 12. Manufactures Exports 1995-2005 (% of Merchandise Exports) 
 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2007. 
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Figure 13. Democracy 1991-2004 (Index from -10 to 10) 
 




Figure 14. Corruption 1998-2006 (Index from 1 to 10) 
 
Source: Transparency International, 1999-2007.  
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Figure 15. Fertility 1960-2005 (Live Births per Woman) 
 




Figure 16. Life Expectancy at Birth 1960-2005 (Years) 
 
 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2007. 
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